COPYRIGHT AS OPPOSED TO
SUBVERSIVE OF COMMON
GOOD
In today’s world there is somewhat an era of piracy.
people copy unauthorized material from tangible
things. To curb this danger COPYRIGHT is
provided by law. copyright may be define as

.

In Justice O'Connor's majority opinion for the
Supreme Court in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enterprises, for example, speaks of copyright
law as the "engine of freedom of expression" To
hold The Nation liable for copyright infringement
for publishing excerpts from Gerald Ford's memoirs
of his presidency was not, in the Court's view, to
condone an act of private censorship. It was
consistent with first amendment principles because
one could count on copyright incentives to ensure
that these memoirs would reach the public

Copyright and free expression principles are, in the
mainstream view, in harmony because copyright
protection is only available to the "expression" of
authors, and not to the "ideas" or information the
authors works may contain [4]. Other authors are
always free to express the same idea or reuse the
information in a protected work in a different way
than the first author. In this way, private censorship
is avoided. Also contributing to the compatibility of
copyright and freedom of expression principles has
been the fair use doctrine. Howard Hughes may have
acquired copyright in a magazine article about him
in order to try to stop publication of an unauthorized
biography. An appellate court rebuffed this
attempted exercise of copyright to accomplish an act
of private censorship, however, by finding that the
biographer had made fair use of the article [5].
Similarly, the owner of the "Pretty Woman"

Crew's sale of a rap parody of that song in part
because it didn't like the meaning of this parody.
However, the Supreme Court found persuasive the
argument that this rap parody was a critical
commentary on the original work that the fair use
doctrine was intended to protect [6]. In these and
other cases, courts have invoked fair use to prevent
the use of copyrights to censor content of which the
author disapproves.
However,
sometimes
fair
use
and
the
idea/expression distinction has failed to maintain
harmony between copyright and free expression
principles. In the aftermath of the Harper & Row
decision, for example, biographers and historians
were at risk of private censorship from copyright if
they quoted from unpublished letters or manuscripts
of public figures, such as the reclusive J.D. Salinger
or the controversial founder of the Scientology
movement [7]. In response to concerns of historians
and biographers, Congress amended the fair use
provision to clarify that the unpublished nature of
copyrighted works does not preclude fair use [8]. A
seeming deviation from the harmony of copyright
and freedom of expression principles was thus
mended, and historians and biographers, among
others, breathed a sigh of relief. On other occasions,
concerns about copyright’s trespass on freedom of
expression principles have been cured by subsequent
court decisions. Some years ago, Fred Yen
expressed concern that the "total concept and feel"
theory of software copyright lawsuits was so vague
as to threaten freedom in computer programming
expression [9]. However, later cases repudiated the
broad "look and feel" claims [10], arguably
rendering Yen's concerns moot.
These doctrines and developments have bred
complacency in most copyright scholars about the
compatibility of copyright and freedom of
expression principles [11]. It would be interesting to
know whether first amendment scholars would find
as much harmony between these principles were

likely that such scholars would import some first
amendment doctrines into their analysis of copyright
issues which might inject a breath of fresh air into
copyright discourse. While copyright scholars have
sometimes visited the first amendment literature to
find support for their arguments on specific
copyright issues, virtually all of the considerable law
review literature on the copyright/freedom of
expression relationship has been unit-directional.
Copyright scholars may be blinded by familiar
doctrines from perceiving certain threats to free
expression values that a first amendment scholar
would easily perceive [12].
This may, however, change. The work of a number
of young copyright scholars -- Yochai Benkler, Julie
Cohen, Neil Netanel, and Mark Lemley, among
them -- recognizes that the potential for disharmony
between copyright and freedom of expression
principles is greater than earlier generations of
scholars may have perceived [13]. These young
scholars have looked to first amendment and other
constitutional principles to shore up limiting
doctrines of copyright law or to make policy
recommendations about how copyright law should
evolve. As admirable as this new literature is, it
largely ignores the fact that copyright has at least as
long a history of being a handmaiden of censorship
as it has a history of being the so-called "engine of
free expression" [14]. Understanding this history
may be valuable in assessing whether this past may
be a prologue to a future in which copyright and
censorship will once again be conjoined.
So let us briefly visit this history: The AngloAmerican copyright regime grew out of practices
and policies of the English Stationers' Guild in the
late 15th and early 16th centuries [15]. To ensure
harmony within the ranks, the guild established a
registry system for staking claims in books.
Members entered into the guild register the names of
the books in which they claimed printing rights [16],
whereupon other guild members were expected to

enforcement system enabled guild members to
resolve disputes amongst themselves over rights in
particular books. While some stationers in this era
were surely noble fellows who sought to enlighten
the public, the private copyright system of the premodern era mainly functioned to regulate the book
trade to ensure that members of the guild enjoyed
monopolies in the books they printed.
This system was, however, conducive to taking on a
second function. Conveniently for English
authorities, the guild's practices provided an
infrastructure for controlling (i.e., suppressing)
publication of heretical and seditious materials. The
English kings and queens were quite willing to grant
to the Stationers Guild control over the publication
of books in the realm in exchange for the guilds
promise to refrain from printing such dangerous
materials [17]. Until its abolition, the Star Chamber
was available to back up judgments emanating from
the stationers private enforcement and censorship
system.
If the pre-modern copyright system promoted
freedom of expression by making books more
widely available, this was an incidental byproduct of
the market that arose for books, not an intended
purpose of the then-prevailing copyright system. Far
more harmonious was the relationship between
copyright and censorship in that era. Men burned at
the stake for writing texts that were critical of the
Crown or of established religion. The stationers
copyright regime was part of the apparatus aimed at
ensuring that these texts would not be printed or
otherwise be widely accessible to the public.
The development that ushered in the modern era of
copyright was the English Parliaments passage of
the Statute of Anne in 1710 [18]. On its face, this
statute was not only a repudiation of several
principal tenets of the stationers copyright system; it
was also a redirection of copyright's purpose away
from censorship and toward freedom of expression

among printers and booksellersthat is, to break the
stranglehold that major players in the Stationers'
Company had over the book trade. Insofar as that
monopoly continued in revised form, the statute
provided recourse for those injured by excessive
prices of books.
The key aspects of the Statute of Anne for achieving
these goals were these: First, the act granted rights to
authors, not to publishers. Second, it did so for the
utilitarian purpose of inducing learned men to write
and publish books. Third, the act established a larger
societal purpose for copyright, namely, to promote
learning. Fourth, it granted rights only in newly
authored books. Thereafter, ancient books were in
the public domain and could be printed by anyone.
Fifth, it limited the duration of copyright to fourteen
year terms (renewable for another fourteen years if
the author was living at the end of that term), thus
abolishing perpetual copyrights [19]. Sixth, the
statute conferred rights of a limited character (not to
control all uses, but to control the printing and
reprinting of protected works). Seventh, it imposed a
responsibility on publishers to deposit copies of their
works with designated libraries. Eighth, it provided a
system for redressing grievances about overpriced
books.
While it took about fifty additional years for premodern system to die out [20], the modern law of
copyright emerged from the Statute of Anne's
precepts. Censorship held no place of honor in this
new copyright system which, in the main, embraced
Enlightenment values that also influenced the
framers of the U.S. Constitution. The clause of this
constitution that empowers Congress to promote the
progress of science and the useful arts by securing to
authors and inventors an exclusive right in their
respective writings and discoveries for limited times
should be viewed in historical context as an
American endorsement of England's repudiation of
the speech-suppressing, anti-competitive and
otherwise repressive pre-modern copyright system

Statute of Anne. Core elements of the Statute of
Anne are reflected in Article I, sec. 8, cl. 8's purpose
("to promote Science"), in the persons to whom
rights were to be granted ("authors"), and in the
duration of rights ("for limited times").
Marci Hamilton has sometimes asserted that the
original Constitution did not include a provision on
freedom of speech because the framers had done
everything necessary to ensure a healthy system of
free expression by authorizing enactment of a
copyright law [21]. Though I would not go that far, I
would agree that the constitutional copyright clause,
properly construed, embodies first amendment and
anti-monopoly principles. Because of this, I agree
with Professor Hamilton that there is a "dormant
copyright clause" waiting to be reawakened in the
case law -- and hopefully in Congress -- after a long
sleep in which the clause has become a meaningless
cliche [22].
To understand why rejuvenation of this clause may
be desirable, it may be worth considering some
parallels between copyright in the pre-modern era
and copyright as it has evolved in the past decade or
so (the trend toward which I will call "copyright in a
post-modern era").
CONSOLIDATION
IN
THE
COPYRIGHT
INDUSTRIES: The rise of publishing and media
giants, such as Reed Elsevier, Time Warner, and
Disney, harkens back to the dominance of certain
London booksellers in the Stationers Company and
their influence on copyright law and policy. As the
work of James Boyle, among others, has shown,
established copyright industries have lately been
very successful in promoting their agenda in the
policy arena as though their interests were the only
interests about which policymakers should be
concerned [23].
THE DECLINE OF THE AUTHOR/THE RISE OF
THE WORK: As in the pre-modern era, the post-

noted, on "the work" and "the copyright," rather than
on "authors" [24]. This post-modern copyright
system promotes the interests of rightsholders in
their works more than it promotes the interests of
individual authors.
THE DECLINE OF UTILITARIAN AND
LEARNING PURPOSES OF COPYRIGHT/ THE
RISE OF PROFIT MAXIMIZATION: From the
standpoint of dominant players in the copyright
industries, the purpose of this law is to maximize
revenues for the benefit of rights holders, not to
provide just enough protection to incant creative
activity, let alone to promote learning or innovation
[25]. Hollywood may have recouped its investments
in films many times over, but if there is any residual
value in those films, Hollywood wishes to exploit
that value. Especially clear proof that the utilitarian
rationale for granting authors limited rights in their
works have given way to pure rent- seeking behavior
is the Congressional decision in 1998 to extend the
copyright term for another twenty years [26].
THE DECLINE OF FAIR USE AND OTHER
COPYRIGHT LIMITATIONS: The pre-modern
copyright system had no "fair use" or other public
interest exceptions to the scope of publisher rights,
nor did it seek to promote science, innovation, or
freedom of expression, values which in the modern
era, have given rise to such exceptions in the modern
era [27]. Fair use and other limitations on the scope
of copyright have been long regarded in U.S.
copyright law as part of the social bargain of the
copyright system [28]. However, U.S. policymakers
in the 1990s have sometimes spoken of fair use and
other limitations as an "unfair tax" on publishers
[29]. They have also predicted that fair use will
recede in importance because of the rise of licensing
schemes through copyright owners can be
compensated for uses of their works [30]. The 1994
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) arguably limits national
authority to create exceptions and limitations that

exploitations of their works [31]. Some
representatives of the copyright industries have
already expressed a desire to use this agreement to
challenge fair use and other exceptions in national
copyright laws [32].
PERPETUAL COPYRIGHTS: In the pre-modern era,
copyrights were perpetual. In the modern era,
copyrights have been limited in duration, long
enough to enable authors and their immediate
families to enjoy the benefits of value the authors
created, but enriching the public domain thereafter.
The decision of the U.S. Congress to extend the term
of copyright for an additional twenty years suggests
that copyright in the post-modern era may be on its
way to becoming perpetual again (on the installment
plan, as Peter Jaszi so wittily observed) [33].
THE DECLINE OF ORIGINALITY AS A
MEANINGFUL CONSTRAINT ON PUBLISHER
RIGHTS: If major information industry players, such
as Reed Elsevier, have their way, Congress will soon
adopt a new form of intellectual property protection
for collections of information that will, in essence,
obviate the need for any "originality" in an
informational work in order for copyright or
copyright-like protection to be available for it [34].
In addition, some firms, Microsoft prominent among
them, claim copyright protection in digitized
versions of public domain works [35]. If these works
cannot be fully controlled by copyright because of
lingering questions about the sufficiency of their
originality, one can expect these firms to use massmarket licenses to get protection for such digital
works via the model licensing law known today as
Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code [36].
EXCESSIVE PRICING: In the post-modern era, as in
the pre-modern era, complaints about excessive
pricing or otherwise burdensome terms and
conditions in licenses for copyrighted works has
once again become common [37]. Universities have
been especially vocal about excessive pricing of

discourse about this issue in the U.S. is any serious
consideration of the possibility of imposing
compulsory licenses, legal licenses, or obligations to
license on fair and reasonable terms as a way to
counteract this problem.
UNCLARITY ABOUT ORIGINS OF RIGHTS: In the
post-modern, as in the pre-modern era, there is
noticeable unclarity about the source of authority
firms have for claiming rights in certain
informational works. Do rights to license works on
any terms or to technically protect copyrighted
works derive from ownership or possession of a
particular artifact, from intellectual property rights
that might pertain to such an artifact, or from some
other legally recognized or asserted right? In the premodern era, printers considered their "copie" rights
to derive from possession of manuscripts and
investments in printing the contents of manuscripts
[38]. In the post-modern era, claims of seemingly
absolute rights to license works on all but
unconscionable terms or to control access to
protected works by encrypting them have an unclear
provenance. Jessica Litman has pointed out that
proposed Article 2B posits the existence of property
rights in information other than those arising from
intellectual property law without specifying exactly
what those rights are or how far they extend [39].
PRIVATE ORDERING/PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT:
Also evident in the post-modern copyright era is a
renewed romance with private ordering. Julie Cohen
has explored similarities between prevalent rhetoric
of commercial exploiters of informational works and
rhetoric from a now discredited Supreme Court
decision that challenged public policy limitations on
freedom of contract [40]. Though Cohen's analysis is
powerful, an even more striking example of private
ordering affecting informational works is the
stationers copyright system. Studying the history of
this system reveals why leaving the exploitation of
informational works solely to private ordering can
have serious deleterious consequences for society, in

dissemination of learning [41]. As in the pre-modern
era, industry groups in the post-modern era have
played significant roles in policing compliance with
copyright norms. Well known is the "hotline" the
Software Publishers' Association provides through
which disgruntled employees and the like can inform
on their employers for unlicensed software [42].
THE
RHETORIC
OF
"PIRACY"
AND
"BURGLARY": Characterizing unauthorized copying
as "piracy" has both pre- and post-modern roots. In
the pre-modern era, the so-called "pirates" were
printers not belonging to the Stationers Company
[43]. Today "pirates" seem to come in many shapes
and sizes. Increasingly common is use of the term
"piracy" to refer to single acts of infringement by
individuals. Major firms in the post-modern
copyright industries are using, or planning to use,
technical protection systems to protect their works
from such "piracy" [44]. They do not intend to rely
solely on this form of private ordering to protect
their interests. They have persuaded Congress to
outlaw the act of bypassing of technical protection
systems used by copyright owners to control access
to their works, as well as technologies that can be
used for access-control or use-control purposes [45].
They liken such bypassing to "burglary" and the
technologies for bypassing to "burglary tools" [46].
The anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital
Millenium Copyright Act, while ambiguous in some
key respects, provides legal reinforcement for this
private ordering, with criminal penalties for willful
violators of these norms [47].
INCREASED CRIMINAL SANCTIONS: The rhetoric
of piracy lends itself to increased use of criminal
penalties to enforce anti-copying norms. Postmodern copyright, like pre-modern copyright,
increasingly looks to criminal law to punish bad
actors in the copyright space. In the modern era,
criminal penalties were reserved for large-scale
commercial infringers. In the post-modern era,
copyright crimes are proliferating. Some of these do

liability; others, notably the anti-circumvention
provisions of the DMCA, require no underlying act
of infringement.
The social, political, and economic context within
which these post-modern developments are
occurring, as well as a continuing belief in modern
copyright precepts by members of the judiciary,
obviously distinguish the post-modern from the premodern copyright era. It would be unduly alarmist to
suggest that post-modernism has totally captured
copyright law or that copyright law will get divorced
from freedom of expression principles in order to
remarry censorship. What may save copyright's
second marriage from doom may well be this larger
context. Yet, it would be naive not to notice the drift
toward a renewed flirtation with censorship
principles and do nothing to stop it.
Working against the enactment of Article 2B is
probably the most significant step that could be
taken to arrest this flirtation. Article 2B works off
the base of copyright, finding in it "informational
rights" that then can be licensed under the Article 2B
aegis. As other copyright scholars have noted, this
model law treats copyright limitations as
presumptively precatory and capable of being
overridden by license terms [48]. Strong criticism of
Article 2B from intellectual property law experts has
led to a lessening of this presumption of the model
law [49]. Article 2B now expressly empowers courts
to withhold enforcement of contract clauses that
violate "fundamental public policy" [50]. However,
this limitation on licensor authority may be
sufficiently vague as to provide little comfort to
persons
arguably
subject
to
a
free
expression/copyright limitation override provision.
Individual computer scientists, for example, may be
deterred from posting on the Internet the results of
performance tests on database programs whose
license terms prohibit public dissemination of such
results. These scientists may be personally
convinced that public policies favoring the free

enough to make such clauses unenforceable, but
they may not be keen to invite litigation to challenge
these restrictions. Also troublesome in mass-market
licenses are clauses aimed at maintaining trade
secrecy-like limitations on use of licensed
information [51]. Such terms might include
prohibitions on reverse-engineering, pledges not to
disclose information, or statements of agreement
with the unpublished nature of information. Such
terms may generally be unobjectionable in the
context of individually negotiated licenses between
sophisticated parties with relatively even bargaining
power. However, they become disturbing if the
licensed work has been the subject of a mass-market
transaction. Even though reverse-engineering
computer program object code may be lawful as a
matter of copyright law [52], license restrictions
may inhibit exercise of this copyright-based
privilege. It remains to be seen whether anticriticism/anti-reverse engineering clauses will
proliferate and how courts will deal with them [53].
The potential certainly exists for Article 2B to be
used to accomplish acts of private censorship that
copyright and freedom of expression principles, left
to their own devices, would disfavor.
A more direct way in which copyright may enable
private censorship arises from the new anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA. One
provision of this law makes it illegal to circumvent a
technical protection system used by a copyright
owner to control access to its work [54]; another
outlaws the manufacture or distribution of
technologies primarily produced or designed to
circumvent access controls [55]. To illustrate how
this rule might impact first amendment values,
consider this example: Suppose that an employee of
a major chemical company gave a reporter a disk
containing a digital copy of a report pertaining to a
major chemical spill that the company was trying to
cover up. If information on the disk is technically
protected and the company has not authorized the
employee to give the document to the reporter, the

system to get access to the report would, on a strict
interpretation of the anti-circumvention law, be
illegal [56]. Also illegal, on a strict interpretation,
would be the writing of a short program to enable
the reporter to read the document in plaintext [57].
Consideration of free press and free speech interests
might suggest that an act of circumvention for this
purpose and the development of a tool to read the
report were justifiable. One subsection of the
DMCA's anti-circumvention provision states that
"[n]othing in this section shall enlarge or diminish
any rights of free speech or the press for activities
using consumer electronics, telecommunications, or
computing products" [58]. But how much comfort
would this offer to the reporter or his newspaper?
Congress realize the potential for the anticircumvention provision to conflict with free speech
interests [59]. However, it provided very little
guidance on how to mediate or resolve the tension
between the interests of free speech and those
underlying the anti-circumvention rule [60].
For copyright law to remain true to the modern
aspiration to live in harmony with freedom of
expression principles (and to remain divorced from
censorship principles), those who deeply believe in
its second marriage will need to be steadfast in
monitoring the evolution of this policy. Postmodernism has made considerable headway.
However, the struggle is far from over. Much of the
work that needs to be done to avert dire
consequences is, oddly enough; work suitable to
scholars of constitutional and copyright law. Peter
Jaszi has identified the important task of developing
a new and more powerful rhetoric that will allow us
to maintain constitutionally grounded values in
copyright law and policy [61]. Copyrights past will
unquestionably be a prologue to its future. The
principal question is: to which of its pasts shall we
chart its course? Which choice we make will have
profound consequences for the kind of information
society in which we will be living in the twenty-first
century [62].
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